Love for quality, comparative advantage, and trade by Jaimovich, E & Merella, V
Love for Quality, Comparative Advantage, and Trade
Esteban Jaimovichy Vincenzo Merellaz
This Version: June 2015
First Version: March 2011
Abstract
We propose a Ricardian trade model with horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation, where will-
ingness to pay for quality rises with income, and productivity di¤erentials across countries are
stronger for high-quality varieties of goods. Our theory predicts that the scope for trade widens
and international specialisation intensies as incomes grow and wealthier consumers raise the
quality of their consumption baskets. This implies that comparative advantages strengthen
gradually over the path of development as a by-product of the process of quality upgrading.
The evolution of comparative advantages leads to specic trade patterns that change over the
growth path, by linking richer importers to more specialised exporters. We provide empirical
support for this prediction, showing that the share of imports originating from exporters ex-
hibiting a comparative advantage in a specic product correlates positively with the importers
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1 Introduction
Income is a key determinant of consumer choice. A crucial dimension through which purchasing
power inuences this choice is the quality of consumption. People with very di¤erent incomes
tend to consume commodities within the same category of goods, such as clothes, cars, wines, etc.
However, the actual quality of the consumed commodities di¤ers substantially when comparing
poorer to richer households. The same reasoning naturally extends to countries with di¤erent
levels of income per capita. In this case, the quality dimension of consumption entails important
implications on the evolution of trade ows.
Several recent studies have investigated the links between quality of consumption and interna-
tional trade. One strand of literature has centred their attention on the demand side, nding a
strong positive correlation between quality of imports and the importers income per head [Hallak
(2006), Fieler (2012)].1 Another set of papers has focused instead on whether exporters adjust the
quality of their production to serve markets with di¤erent income levels. The evidence here also
points towards the presence of nonhomothetic preferences along the quality dimension, showing
that producers sell higher quality versions of their output to richer importers.2
These empirical ndings have motivated a number of models that yield trade patterns where
richer importers buy high-quality versions of goods, while exporters di¤erentiate the quality of
their output by income at destination [Hallak (2010), Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011),
Jaimovich and Merella (2012)]. Yet, this literature has approached the determinants of countries
sectoral specialisation as a phenomenon that is independent of the process of quality upgrading re-
sulting from higher consumer incomes. In this paper, we propose a theory where quality upgrading
becomes the central driving force behind a general process of sectoral specialisation and compara-
tive advantage intensication. The crucial novel feature of our theory is that quality upgrading by
consumers leads to a strengthening in countriesspecialisation in the sectors where they exhibit
a relative cost advantage. Therefore, the quality of the goods consumed and exchanged in world
markets becomes a rst-order determinant of the evolution of countries sectoral specialisation,
and of the intensity of the trade links that importers establish with di¤erent exporters.
1See also related evidence in Choi et al. (2009), Francois and Kaplan (1996) and Dalgin et al. (2008).
2For example, Verhoogen (2008) and Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) provide evidence of Mexican manufacturing
plants selling higher qualities in the US than in their local markets. Brooks (2006) establishes the same results for
Colombian manufacturing plants, and Manova and Zhang (2012) show that Chinese rms ship higher qualities of
their exports to richer importers. Analogous evidence is provided by Bastos and Silva (2010) for Portuguese rms,
and by Crino and Epifani (2012) for Italian ones.
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Our theory is grounded on the hypothesis that productivity di¤erentials are stronger for higher-
quality goods, combined with willingness to pay for quality that rises with income. Within this
framework, we show that international specialisation and sectoral trade intensify over the growth
path. The evolution of trade ows presents novel specicities that stem from the interaction
between nonhomothetic preferences and the deepening of sectoral productivity di¤erentials at
higher levels of quality. In particular, the process of quality upgrading with rising incomes sets in
motion a simultaneous increase in specialisation by importers and exporters. Import and export
specialisation arise as intertwined phenomena because, as countries become richer, consumers shift
their spending towards high-quality goods, which are exactly those that tend to display greater
scope for international trade.
We model a world economy with a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated goods, each of them
available in a continuum of vertically ordered quality levels. The production technology di¤ers both
across countries and sectors. We assume that some countries are intrinsically better than others
in producing certain types of goods. In addition, these intrinsic productivity di¤erentials on the
horizontal dimension tend to become increasingly pronounced along the vertical dimension. These
assumptions lead to an intensifying process of sectoral specialisation as production moves up on
the quality ladders of each good. For example, a country may have a cost advantage in producing
wine, while another country may have it in whisky. This would naturally lead them to exchange
these two goods. Yet, in our model, productivity di¤erences in the wine and whisky industries do
not remain constant along the quality space, but become more intense as production moves up
towards higher quality versions of these goods. As a result, the scope for international trade turns
out to be wider for high-quality wines and whiskies than for low-quality ones.
A key feature of our model is the embedded link between nonhomotheticities in quality and
international trade at the sectoral level. More precisely, as richer individuals upgrade the quality
of their consumption baskets, sectoral productivity di¤erentials across countries become stronger,
leading to the intensication of some trading partnerships and the weakening of others. In that
respect, our model suggests that the study of the evolution of trade links may require a more
exible concept of comparative advantage than the one traditionally used, so as to encompass
quality upgrading as an inherent part of it. In the literature of Ricardian trade, the comparative
advantage is univocally determined by exporterstechnologies. This paper instead sustains that
both the importersincomes and the exporterssectoral productivities must be jointly taken into
account in order to establish a rank of comparative advantage. This is because the degree of com-
parative advantage between any two countries is crucially a¤ected by the quality of consumption.
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As a consequence, richer and poorer importers may end up establishing trade links of substan-
tially di¤erent intensity with the same set of exporters, simply because the gaps between their
willingness-to-pay for quality may translate into unequal degrees of comparative advantage across
their trade partners.
The conditionality of comparative advantage on importers incomes entails novel testable pre-
dictions on the evolution of sectoral trade ows. In particular, our model predicts that the share
of imports originating from exporters exhibiting a cost advantage must grow with the income per
head of the importer. This is the result of richer importers buying high-quality versions of goods,
which are those for which cost di¤erentials across countries are relatively more pronounced. Using
bilateral trade data at the sectoral level, we provide evidence consistent with the prediction that
richer economies are more likely to buy their imports from producers who display a comparative
advantage in the imported goods.
Finally, our theory also has implications in terms of policy, particularly with regard to stim-
ulating the growth of a specic industry through import tari¤s or subsidies to local producers.
Using simple comparative statics, we show that the gains from free trade are stronger for more
developed economies, as their consumers su¤er a greater welfare loss when the tari¤ is imposed on
more e¢ cient producers. In addition, our results suggest that subsidies have a larger impact at
fostering local production when introduced in developing countries.
Related Literature
Nonhomothetic preferences are by now a widespread modelling choice in the trade literature.
However, most of the past trade literature with nonhomotheticities has focused either on vertical
di¤erentiation [e.g., Flam and Helpman (1987), Stokey (1991) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997)]
or horizontal di¤erentiation in consumption [e.g., Markusen (1986), Bergstrand (1990) and Mat-
suyama (2000)].3 Two recent articles have combined vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation with
preferences featuring income-dependent willingness to pay for quality: Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011) and Jaimovich and Merella (2012).
3For some recent contributions with horizontal di¤erentiation and nonhomothetic preferences see: Foellmi, Hep-
enstrick and Zweimuller (2012) and Tarasov (2012), where consumers are subject to a discrete consumption choice;
Fieler (2011) who ties the income elasticity of consumption goods across di¤erent industries to the elasticity of
substitution of goods within the same industry; Simonovska (2015) who xes a bounded level of utility for each
di¤erentiated good; Breinlich and Cuñat (2013) who combine a Stone-Geary representation with Armington aggre-
gators of country-specic varieties; and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Zhelobodko et al. (2012) and Dhingra and
Morrow (2012), who adopt non-homothetic specications of preferences delivering linear demand systems.
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Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) analyse how di¤erences in income distributions between economies
with access to the same technologies determine trade ows in the presence of increasing returns and
trade costs. Like ours, their paper leads to an endogenous emergence of comparative advantages.
In their case, this could be either due to trade costs being too high to allow trade, or countries
income distributions being too similar to induce specialisation via a home-market e¤ect. Our paper,
instead, sticks to the Ricardian tradition where trade and specialisation stem from cross-country
di¤erences in sectoral technologies featuring constant returns to scale. Comparative advantages
and trade emerge gradually in our model, not because trade costs initially hinder the scope for
exchange in the presence of increasing returns to scale, but because the demand for commodities
displaying wider heterogeneity in cost of production (the high-quality goods) expands as incomes
rise.4
Jaimovich and Merella (2012) also propose a nonhomothetic preference specication where
budget reallocations take place both within and across horizontally di¤erentiated goods. That pa-
per, however, remained within a standard Ricardian framework where absolute and comparative
advantages are determined from the outset, and purely by technological conditions. Hence, nonho-
mothetic preferences play no essential role there in determining export and import specialisation
at di¤erent levels of development. By contrast, it is the interaction between rising di¤erences in
productivity at higher quality levels and nonhomotheticities in quality that generates our novel
results in terms of co-evolution of export and import specialisation.
A key assumption in our theory is the widening in productivity di¤erentials at higher levels of
quality. To the best of our knowledge, Alcala (2012) is the only other paper that has explicitly
introduced a similar feature into a Ricardian model of trade. An important di¤erence between
the two papers is that Alcalas keeps the homothetic demand structure presented in Dornbusch,
Fisher and Samuelson (1977) essentially intact. Nonhomotheticities in demand are indeed crucial
to our story. In particular, they underlie our predictions regarding the evolution of trade ows and
specialisation at di¤erent levels of income.
Finally, Fieler (2011) also studies the interplay between nonhomothetic demand and Ricardian
technological disparities. She shows that, when productivity di¤erences are stronger for goods with
high income elasticity, her model matches quite closely key features of North-North and North-
South trade. While her model exhibits horizontal di¤erentiation, it does not display vertical
4 In this regard, an important feature present in our model is that high-quality versions of goods are inherently
more tradable than low-quality ones, while this is not necessarily the case in Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) unless they
specically assume quality-specic trade costs that are restricted to be relatively lower for high-quality varieties.
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di¤erentiation, which is a crucial dimension exploited by our model. Our mechanism di¤ers from
hers in that the e¤ects of demand on trade ows stem from the (vertical) reallocation of consumer
spending within categories of goods rather than (horizontally) across them. It is in fact this
within-good substitution process that leads to our main predictions where spending shares across
di¤erent exporters of the same good change with the income of the importer.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 studies a world economy with a
continuum of countries where all economies have the same level of income per head in equilibrium.
Section 3 generalises the main results to a world economy where some countries are richer than
others. Section 4 presents some empirical results consistent with the main predictions of our model.
Section 5 provides some further discussion in terms of policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
All relevant proofs can be found in the Appendices.
2 A world economy with equally rich countries
We study a world economy with a unit continuum of countries indexed by v. In each country there
is a continuum of individuals with unit mass. Each individual is endowed with one unit of labour
time. We assume labour is immobile across countries. In addition, we assume all countries are
open to international trade, and there are no trading costs of any sort.
All countries share a common commodity space dened along three distinct dimensions: a
horizontal, a varietal, and a vertical dimension. Concerning the horizontal dimension, there exists
a unit continuum of di¤erentiated goods, indexed by z. In terms of the varietal dimension, we
assume that each country v produces a specic variety v of each good z. Finally, our vertical
dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of the commodity: we assume that a continuum of di¤erent
qualities q  1 are potentially available for each good z.5
Our model will display two main distinctive features. First, productivity di¤erentials across
countries will rise with the quality level of the commodities being produced. Second, richer in-
dividuals will choose to consume higher-quality commodities than poorer ones. The next two
subections specify the functional forms of production technologies and consumer utility that we
adopt to generate these two features.
5To x ideas, the horizontal dimension refers to di¤erent types of goods, such as cars, wines, co¤ee beans, etc.
The varietal dimension refers to the di¤erent varieties of any given type of good, originating from di¤erent countries,
such as Spanish and French wines (di¤ering, for instance, in specic traits like the types of grapes and regional
vinication techniques). The vertical dimension refers to the intrinsic quality of each specic commodity (e.g., the
ageing and the grapes selection in the winemaking).
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2.1 Production technologies
In each country v there exists a continuum of rms that may transform local labour into a variety
v of good z. Production technologies are idiosyncratic both to the sector z and to the country v.
In order to produce one unit of commodity z at the quality level q, a rm from country v needs to
use  z;v (q) units of labour, where:
 z;v (q) =
A
1 + 
qz;v : (1)
Unit labour requirements contain two key technological parameters. The rst is  > 0, which
applies identically to all sectors and countries, and we interpret it as the worldwide total factor
productivity level. As such, in our model, increases in  will capture the e¤ects of aggregate growth
and rising real incomes. The second is z;v, which may di¤er both across z and v, and governs
the elasticity of the labour requirements with respect to quality upgrading. In what follows, we
assume that each parameter z;v is independently drawn from a probability density function with
uniform distribution over the interval

; 

. In addition, we assume that  > 1. Hence,  z;v (q)
are always strictly increasing and convex in q. The term A  e ( 1)=( 1) is simply a scale factor
between labour input units and quality units, introduced for mathematical convenience.
An important feature implicit in the functional form of (1) is that cross-country sectoral pro-
ductivity di¤erentials will widen with the level of quality of production. This feature will in turn
imply that the cost advantage of countries with better sectoral productivity draws will expand at
higher levels of quality of production.
Let wv denote henceforth the wage per unit of labour time in country v. We assume that, in
all countries and all sectors, rms face no entry costs. In equilibrium, all commodities will then be
priced exactly at their unit cost. Hence, the variety of good z in quality q produced by country v
will be sold (internationally) at price:
pz;v (q) =
Awv
1 + 
qz;v . (2)
Notice from (2) that changes in  leave all relative prices unaltered. In this regard, we may
consider a rise in total factor productivity  as resulting in a pure increase in real income, entailing
no substitution e¤ect across the di¤erent commodities.
2.2 Utility function and budget constraint
To simplify the analysis, we introduce the following assumption concerning consumer choice:
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Assumption 1 (Selection of quality) Individuals consume a strictly positive amount of (at
most) one quality version of each good z produced by country v.
Assumption 1 is analogous to assuming an innite elasticity of substitution across di¤erent quality
versions of the good z sourced from country v. Henceforth, to ease notation, we denote the selected
quality of the good z sourced from country v by qz;v. In addition, we denote by cz;v the consumed
physical quantity of the selected quality qz;v.
Utility is dened over the consumed quantities cz;v in the selected qualities qz;v. Formally:
U =
Z
Z
Z
V
ln (cz;v)
qz;v dv

dz
 1

; where  < 0: (3)
An individual with income w chooses the quantity to consume for each selected quality, subject
to the budget constraint: Z
Z
Z
V
pz;v (qz;v) cz;v dv

dz  w, (4)
where each pz;v (qz;v) in (4) is given by the price functions (2) when q is equal to the selected
quality qz;v.
The utility function (3) displays a number of features that are worth discussing in detail.
Firstly, considering the quality dimension in isolation, the exponential terms (cz;v)
qz;v in (3) are
instrumental to obtaining our desired non-homothetic behaviour along the quality space. The
exponential form implies that, whenever cz;v > 1, the magnifying e¤ect of quality becomes in-
creasingly important as cz;v rises. Such non-homothetic feature in turn leads to a solution of the
consumer problem where higher incomes will translate into quality upgrading of consumption.
Secondly, abstracting now from the quality dimension, (3) features two nested CES functions: i)
the (inner) logarithmic function implies a unit elasticity of substitution across varieties of the same
good z; ii) the parameter  < 0 governs the elasticity of substitution across goods, which is equal
to 1= (1  ) < 1. Thus, the elasticity of substitution across di¤erent goods is smaller than within
goods (i.e., across the di¤erent varieties of the same good).
2.3 Utility maximisation
Consider a representative individual in a generic country. The consumers problem requires max-
imising (3) subject to (4). This is a problem that could be in principle solved in terms of physical
quantities of consumption for each good. However, Assumption 1 allows us to easily re-state the
problem in terms of two other variables that we will henceforth use: selected qualities and budget
allocations. More precisely, denoting by z;v the share of income spent in the good z sourced from
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country v, by using Assumption 1 we may write:
cz;v =
z;v w
pz;v(qz;v)
; (5)
where, again, the expression pz;v (qz;v) in (5) is given by the price functions (2) with q = qz;v.
In the next sections, we will study how the intensity of sectoral trade partnerships change at
di¤erent levels of consumer income within a full general equilibrium framework. However, it proves
useful to present rst the formal solution of the consumer problem in the specic case when the
wage is the same for all countries; that is, when wv = w for all v. This will allow us to convey
some preliminary intuition for the mechanism underlying the general equilibrium results presented
later on.6
Lemma 1 (Optimal selected quality and budget allocation) When all countries have the
same wage, for each good z produced in country v, the consumer chooses the level of quality:
qz;v =

(1 + ) =A
ez;vQ
1=(z;v 1)
; (6)
and allocates the share of income
z;v =

(1 + ) =A
(eQ)z;v
1=(z;v 1)
; (7)
where the variable Q  RZ RV qz;v dv dz in the denominator of (6) and (7) denotes the average
quality of the optimal consumption bundle chosen by the consumer.
Lemma 1 characterises the solution of the consumers problem in terms of two sets of variables:
the expressions in (6), which stipulate the quality level in which each variety of every good is
optimally consumed; the expressions in (7), describing the optimal expenditure shares allocated
to those commodities. An important implication of Lemma 1 is the implicit link between optimal
budget shares and optimal qualities. In particular, plugging (6) into (7) yields z;v = qz;v=Q.
Lemma 2 (Nonhomotheticity in quality of consumption) The selected quality of the con-
sumed goods rises as the real income of the consumer increases; that is: @qz;v=@ > 0. Further-
more, the process of quality upgrading is more pronounced for the varieties of the good sourced from
countries that can more easily improve its quality; that is: @2qz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0.
6The next section shows that, in this symmetric specication of the model, all wages will in any case turn out
to be equal in equilibrium. As a consequence, there is no loss of generality by preliminarily proceeding to study the
optimum of the consumer problem when wv = w for all v.
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Lemma 2 summarises the key nonhomothetic aspect present in our model: quality upgrading
of consumption. From the result @qz;v=@ > 0 it follows that, as real incomes grow with a rising ,
individuals substitute lower-quality versions of every good z by better versions of them.7 Moreover,
the cross-derivative @2qz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0 implies that the quality rise is faster for commodities
supplied by countries that received better sectoral productivity draws (i.e., lower values of ).
Jointly considered, the two lemmas underlie the main source of interaction between supply and
demand sides that we will exploit in our general equilibrium analysis: as  grows, producers better
able at upgrading quality in a particular sector will gradually attract larger world expenditure
shares in that sector.
2.4 General equilibrium
In equilibrium, total world spending on commodities produced in country v must equal the total
labour income in country v. Denoting by iz;v the expenditure share by importer i in the variety
of good z produced in country v, we may write down the market clearing condition as follows:Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v wi di dz = wv; (8)
where wi refers to the income of country i.
More formally, an equilibrium in the world economy is given by a set of wages wv for each
country v such that: i) prices of all traded commodities are determined by (2); ii) all consumers in
the world choose their commodity spending by maximising (3) subject to (4); and iii) the market
clearing conditions stipulated in (8) hold simultaneously for all countries.
In this world economy, the ex-ante symmetry across countries implies that, in equilibrium, all
country wages wv will always turn out to be equal to each other. Thus, we can simply write that
wv = w, for any level of  > 0.8 The reason for this result is the following: as  rises, and real
incomes accordingly increase, aggregate demands and supplies grow together at identical speed
in all countries. As a consequence, markets clearing conditions in (8) will constantly hold true
without the need of any adjustment in relative wages across economies.
The fact that relative wages remain constant over the path of development conceals the fact
that, as  increases, economies actually experience signicant changes in their consumption and
7As we mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, variations in  a¤ect all prices in (2) in the same proportion, leaving
all relative prices unchanged. Thus, a rise in  leads consumers to upgrade their quality of consumption via a pure
income-e¤ect. In fact, a rise in  entails the same e¤ects as an exogenous increase of w (in that regard, the parameter
 plays a role that is isomorphic to that of the units of e¢ ciency labour available to each individual).
8For a formal proof of this result, see Proposition ?? in the Online Appendix.
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production structures at the sectoral level. Such sectoral reallocations stem from the interplay
of demand and supply side factors. On the demand side, as real incomes grow with a rising ,
individuals consume higher quality versions of each commodity as can be observed from (6). On
the supply side, heterogeneities in sectoral labour productivities across countries become stronger
as producers raise the quality of their output as can be gleaned from (1). As we will formally show
next, the interplay between income-dependent willingness to pay for quality and intensication of
sectoral productivity di¤erences at higher levels of quality leads to a process of ever increasing
sectoral specialisation as  rises.
2.5 Sectoral specialisation
We study now the e¤ects of the above-mentioned sectoral reallocations on the sectoral trade ows.
With regards to the demand side of the economy, we examine the import penetration (IP) of good
z sourced from country v in the destination country i, dened as:
IP iz;v 
M iz;v
M iz
; (9)
where M iz;v denotes the value of imports of good z sourced from country v, and M
i
z is the total
value of imports of good z.
For the supply side, we consider the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of country v in
sector z. Formally:
RCAz;v  Xz;v=Xv
Wz=W
: (10)
In the numerator of (10), Xz;v denotes the value of exports of good z by country v, and Xv the
value of total exports by country v. In the denominator of (10), Wz refers to the value of exports
of good z worldwide, and W represents the value of total exports in the world.
Lemma 3 (Import penetration and revealed comparative advantage) In a world econo-
my where all countries have the same income, for every variety v of good z, the measures of import
penetration and revealed comparative advantage equal the share of income spent on that commodity.
Formally:
1. For any importer i of variety v of good z: IP iz;v = z;v.
2. For any exporter v of good z: RCAz;v = z;v.
In our symmetric world economy, the revealed comparative advantage of country v in good
z and the import penetration of variety v of good z mirror one another. This is the result of
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all countries displaying the same income (coupled with individuals having the same preferences
worldwide and the absence of trade costs) which entails that all consumers will choose exactly the
same optimal consumption bundle. The next proposition shows how these measures of bilateral
trade ows relate to countriessectoral productivity draws, and how they evolve as real incomes
rise in the world economy.
Proposition 1 In a world economy where all countries have the same income, the degree of spe-
cialisation in sector z is larger for countries that received better sectoral productivity draws in that
sector. In addition, sectoral specialisation intensies as the real incomes of individuals increase.
Formally, for any sector z and any pair of countries v0 and v00 such that z;v0 < z;v00:
1. z;v0 > z;v00. Therefore, RCAz;v0 > RCAz;v00, and IP
i
z;v0 > IP
i
z;v00 for any importer i.
2.
@z;v0
@ >
@z;v00
@ . Thus,
@(RCAz;v0 RCAz;v00)
@ > 0, and
@

IP i
z;v0 IP iz;v00

@ > 0 for any importer i.
Proposition 1 merges together supply side and demand side results. It rstly describes how
export and import specialisation relate to the sectoral productivity draws, and secondly it shows
how both measures evolve as real incomes grow with a rising value of .
From a supply side perspective, Proposition 1 states that the RCA in sector z are monotonically
linked to the sectoral productivity draws z;v: countries that receive better draws for sector z
exhibit a higher RCA in that sector. More importantly, the second result in the proposition shows
that this gap further intensies as  rises. This last result is what we interpret as increasing export
specialisation along the growth path.
From a demand side perspective, Proposition 1 may be interpreted in terms of increasing import
specialisation along the growth path. More precisely, the result that @(IP iz;v0   IP iz;v00)=@ > 0
means that, as consumers get richer, we observe a process of growing import penetration of the
varieties of z produced by exporters who enjoy a higher RCA in sector z.
The joint consideration of these two arguments suggests that, over the path of development,
countries with a cost advantage in a given sector will increasingly specialise in that sector. At
the same time, these countries will also attract a growing share of the world spending in that
particular sector. Intuitively, as world consumers raise the quality of their consumption when
 grows, sectoral productivity di¤erentials across countries widen up, leading to an increase in
sectoral trade specialisation. Interestingly, this process takes place both at the importer and at
the exporter level. In this regard, a central prediction of our model is the implicit secular tendency
of sectoral trade ows to gravitate towards exporters with a rising cost advantage in the sector.
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This, in turn, means that while some bilateral sectoral trade links will intensify during the path
of development, others will gradually fade.9
3 A world economy with cross-country inequality
The previous section has dealt with a world economy where all countries exhibit the same real in-
come, while we let the worldwide total factor productivity parameter  increase. Such an analytical
framework allowed us to portray the behaviour of sectoral trade ows (and sectoral specialisation
patterns) within a world economy where countries shared a common growth path.
In this section, we slightly modify the previous setup to give room for cross-country inequality.
To keep the focus as clean as possible (departing from Section 2) we now hold constant the para-
meter . More importantly, we no longer force sectoral productivity di¤erentials to be drawn from
the same probability distribution function, which was the ultimate reason leading to equal equilib-
rium wages. This alternative setup allows us to generalise the previous results concerning export
specialisation to a case in which productivity di¤erentials and cost di¤erentials may not always
coincide (as a result of equilibrium wages that di¤er across countries). In addition, introducing
cross-country inequality leads to more powerful predictions concerning import penetration (of the
di¤erent export sources) at di¤erent income levels, which we will contrast with cross-sectional data
of bilateral trade ows in Section 4.
We keep the same commodity space and preference structure as those previously used in Section
2. However, we now assume that the world is composed by two subsets of countries. We will refer
to the two subsets as region H and region L and, whenever it proves convenient, to a generic
country by h or l, respectively. We let countries in H and L di¤er from each other in that they
face di¤erent random generating processes for their sectoral productivity parameters. For any
country h, we assume that z;h for each good z is independently drawn from a uniform density
function with support

; 

, where  > 1, just like before. Instead, for any country l, we assume
that z;l =  for every good z.
10
9The equilibrium characterised in this section has the particular feature that revealed comparative advantages
coincide with the import penetrations. This is clearly a very specic result that hinges on the assumed symmetry in
the distributions of sector-specic productivities across countries. The next section shows that this is no longer the
case when we introduce some asymmetry across countries.
10None of our results hinge upon countries in region L drawing their sectoral productivity parameters from a
degenerate distribution. In the Appendix B, we extend the results of this section to a world economy with multiple
regions, and where all sectoral productivities are drawn from non-degenerate uniform distributions.
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This alternative setup still features the fact that sectoral productivity di¤erentials become
increasingly pronounced at higher levels of quality. In addition, it also allows for the presence of
absolute advantages (at the aggregate level) across regions.11
The ex-ante symmetry across countries from the same region implies now that, in equilibrium,
wages of countries within that region must be equal. By contrast, wages in region H must neces-
sarily be higher than in region L. More formally, in equilibrium: wh = wh0 for any pair of countries
h; h0 2 H, and wl = wl0 for any l; l0 2 L, where wh > wl.12
The intuition for wh > wl is analogous to all Ricardian models of trade with absolute and
comparative advantages. Essentially, region H (which displays an absolute advantage over region
L) will enjoy higher wages than region L, since this is necessary to lower the production costs in L,
thereby allowing countries in L to export enough to countries in H and keep the trade balance in
equilibrium. Henceforth, without loss of generality, we take the wage in region L as the numeraire
of the economy. We accordingly set wl = 1, with wh > 1 hereafter denoting the relative wage
between region H and region L.
The rst set of results that di¤er qualitatively from those obtained in a world economy with
symmetric countries are to do with quality of consumption and quality of production. Consid-
ering the former, nonhomothetic preferences on the quality dimension imply that consumers in
H purchase higher quality consumption bundles than consumers in L. For the latter, the di¤er-
ence in wage between the two regions will distort the monotonicity between the monetary cost of
production and sectoral productivity draws (z;v) present throughout Section 2.
Proposition 2 In a two-region world where income is higher in region H than in region L:
1. Consumers from region H select higher quality versions than consumers from region L.
2. All consumers set the level of quality highest for the varieties sourced from countries in
H that received the best possible sectoral productivity draw, z;h = , and lowest for the
varieties sourced from countries in H that received the worst possible sectoral productivity
draw, z;h = . Furthermore, the quality level of varieties sourced from countries in L lies
within those two extreme levels.
11Another way to introduce a source of absolute advantages into our framework would be by letting total factor
productivity be higher in region H than in region L, namely: h > l. Adding h > l to the aggregate productivity
gap resulting from the regionally di¤erent random generating processes for z;v would just reinforce the equilibrium
wage di¤erential between H and L, while it would not qualitatively change any of the main results obtained in this
section.
12For a formal proof of this result, see Proposition ?? in the Online Appendix.
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3. All consumers choose higher qualities for the varieties sourced from countries in H that
received better sectoral productivity draws.
The rst result stems again from the rising willingness-to-pay for quality implied by (3): richer
consumers substitute lower-quality versions of each good z by higher-quality versions of them.
The second result shows that the highest quality of each good z, purchased by any consumer, is
produced in the country in region H that received the best possible draw, z;h = . Conversely,
the lowest quality of each good z, purchased by any consumer, is produced in the country in region
H that received the worst possible draw, z;h = . Notice that, although all countries in region L
also receive draws equal to , the lower labour cost there allows them to sell higher qualities than
the least e¢ cient producers in region H. Finally, the third result shows that, when considering
only commodities produced in region H, the quality of consumption is a monotonically decreasing
function of the elasticities of quality upgrading z;h. Intuitively, since all countries in region H
have the same wage, a larger z;h maps monotonically into a higher production cost (for a given
the level of quality), thus consumers worldwide nd it optimal to demand higher quality varieties
from countries with lower draws of z;h.
3.1 Export specialisation
Assume henceforth that a fraction  2 (0; 1) of all countries in the world belong to region H. We
proceed now to study the patterns of exportersspecialisation in this world economy with cross-
country inequality. We let Hz;h and 
L
z;h denote henceforth the expenditure share in the variety of
good z produced in country h by a consumer from region H and L, respectively.
Lemma 4 (Revealed comparative advantage in a world with cross-country inequality)
In a two-region world economy with wh > 1, the measures of revealed comparative advantage for a
generic good z are
1. for any country l:
RCAz;l = 1; (11)
2. for any country h:
RCAz;h =
Hz;hwh + (1  )Lz;h
wh
: (12)
The result in (11) states that in every country in region L the revealed comparative advantages
are identical for all goods; this is the consequence of all sectors in those countries receiving the
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exact same draw, z;l = . Revealed comparative advantages do vary though across countries in
region H. In particular, since Hz;h and 
L
z;h are decreasing functions of the sectoral productivity
draws z;h, (12) implies that the RCAz;h is also a decreasing function of z;h. Moreover, such
monotonicity of the demand intensities also means that the revealed comparative advantage of
the country belonging to H with draw  will turn out to be lower than that of any country in L.
Similarly, the revealed comparative advantage of the country belonging to H with draw  will be
higher than that of any country in L. These results are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let RCAz; and RCAz; denote the revealed comparative advantage in sector z
of countries in region H that received the best possible productivity draw, z;h = ; and the worst
possible productivity draw, z;h = , respectively. Then:
1. RCAz; < RCAz;l < RCAz;;
2. The revealed comparative advantage in sector z of country h is a decreasing function of the
sectoral productivity draw: @ (RCAz;h) =@z;h < 0.
The main result to draw from Proposition 3 is that the country (in region H) receiving the
best possible draw in sector z will display as well the highest revealed comparative advantage in
that sector. Notice that these countries are also those supplying the highest quality varieties of
good z, as shown in Proposition 2. Therefore, like in Section 2, countries o¤ering the top quality
varieties in a given sector also exhibit the strongest degree of export specialisation in that sector.
Finally, note that Proposition 3 also implies that there exists a subset of countries in H exhibiting
a lower RCA in sector z than countries in L. The reason is that wh > 1 creates a wedge between
the absolute and the comparative advantage, allowing countries in L to supply more competitively
the relatively low-quality varieties of good z.
3.2 Import specialisation
We turn now to study the implications of this version of the model in terms of import specialisation.
For any destination country in region j = H;L, the import penetration of good z originating from
country v is given by IP jz;v = jz;v =
R
V 
j
z;v dv. Since the budget constraint implies
R
V 
j
z;v dv = 1,
we may then track the behaviour of IP jz;v simply by looking at the demand intensity jz;v.
Proposition 4 Let IP jz; and IP
j
z; denote the import penetration in sector z in region j = H;L
by countries in region H that received best possible productivity draw, z;h = , and the worst
possible productivity draw, z;h = , respectively. Then:
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1. IP jz; < IP
j
z;l < IP
j
z;, where IP
j
z;l is the import penetration in sector z in region j = H;L by
countries in region L. Moreover, for imports sourced from region H, the import penetration
in sector z by a country h is decreasing in its sectoral productivity draw: @IP jz;h=@z;h < 0.
2. The di¤erence in import penetration in any given sector z between a country from H that
received the best possible productivity draw and any other producer of good z is always larger
in region H than in region L. Formally:
IPHz;   IPHz;h > IPLz;   IPLz;h; whenever z;h > ;
IPHz;   IPHz;l > IPLz;   IPLz;l:
The rst part of Proposition 4 can be seen simply as the demand-side counterpart of Proposition
3: importers source a larger share of good z from exporters with a cost advantage in sector z (this is,
ultimately, what turns these exporters into the ones exhibiting the greatest RCA in that sector).
More interestingly, the second part of Proposition 4 states that import specialisation in those
exporters is stronger for richer importers (that is, for countries in region H).
The intuition for this result rests on the specic nonhomothetic structure of (3). As shown in
Proposition 2, richer importers buy high-quality varieties, which are exactly those for which the
cost advantage of countries receiving better sectoral productivity draws widens. In addition, since
the preference structure in (3) also implies that high-quality varieties attract growing consumer
expenditure shares, richer importers tend to spend proportionally more in commodities sourced
from exporters that exhibit a stronger cost advantage in higher-quality varieties.
3.3 Discussion: Sectoral trade ows
The previous subsections have dealt separately with the behaviour of exporters facing importers
with heterogeneous income, and with the behaviour of importers facing exporters with hetero-
geneous cost advantages. The joint consideration of these results yields an additional important
prediction. To illustrate this prediction, we focus now on two intertwined demand-supply relation-
ships implicit in our model: i) the link between the sectoral productivity draw z;v and the RCA
of exporter v in sector z; ii) the link between z;v and the import penetration by exporter v in the
total consumption of good z in a generic destination country i.
Firstly, Proposition 3 implies that, for a given income of the exporter wv, better productivity
draws in sector z lead to a greater RCA in that sector: @RCAz;v=@z;v < 0. Secondly, Proposition
4 adds to this result that (again for a given level of wv) the import penetration in sector z in any
17
destination country i is larger in the case of exporters that received better productivity draws in
sector z: @IP iz;v=@z;v < 0. Furthermore, that proposition also shows that the association between
IP iz;v and z;v becomes stronger in richer importers: @(@IP
i
z;v=@z;v)=@wi < 0.
The above results can in turn be translated into relations between IP iz;v and RCAz;v. In partic-
ular, when holding xed the income of the exporter wv, the model delivers: @IP iz;v=@RCAz;v > 0
and @(@IP iz;v=@RCAz;v)=@wi > 0. The rst of these predictions is simply stating that import pen-
etrations by exporters with a higher RCA will be larger in all importers. More interestingly, the
second entails that, as we move from poorer to richer importers, the positive association between
import penetration and RCA becomes even stronger.
The economic intuition behind this last result is analogous to the one discussed in Section 2
for the case of growing world incomes with a rising . However, with cross-country inequality
this intuition becomes even more apparent because importers with heterogeneous incomes choose
di¤erent quality levels of all varieties, which in turn implies di¤erent distributions of budget shares
across the same set of exporters. More precisely, since richer consumers purchase higher-quality
varieties of each good z, the most productive suppliers of each good z turn out to be better able
to exploit their widening cost advantage when dealing with richer importers.
Our model thus delivers a mechanism entailing a simultaneous rise in sectoral trade specialisa-
tion by importers and exporters at higher incomes: richer importers tend to increasingly specialise
their consumption in the varieties supplied by the exporters who display a stronger revealed com-
parative advantage in the sector producing the good. In the next section we provide evidence
consistent with this prediction using bilateral trade ows at the sectoral level.
4 Empirical analysis
Our theory rests crucially on two fundamental assumptions: one related to cross-country het-
erogeneities in sectoral production functions; the other one related to nonhomotheticities in the
consumerspreference structure. In terms of technologies, we have assumed that cross-country
sectoral productivity di¤erentials widen at higher levels of quality of production. Concerning pref-
erences, we postulated a utility function where richer individuals choose a consumption basket
comprising higher-quality varieties of all available goods.
Taken independently, each of these two assumptions lead to clear testable predictions in terms
of trade ows, which in fact our theory shares with several other papers in the trade literature.
First, our model implies that the degree of specialisation of countries in particular goods and the
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level of quality of their exports of those goods should display a positive correlation.13 Second,
our model implies that richer consumers buy their imports in higher quality levels than poorer
consumers do.14
Besides these two results, the most interesting testable prediction of our model stems from the
interaction between the above-mentioned assumptions. When taste for quality rises with income
and sectoral cost advantages deepen at higher levels of quality, richer countries will purchase a
larger share of their imports of every good from economies displaying a stronger revealed com-
parative advantage in the sector producing the good. In other words, our model yields novel
predictions regarding import specialisation at di¤erent income levels, which link richer importers
more intensely to highly specialised exporters in each of the sectors.
4.1 Baseline regression structure
Recall from Section 3.3 that, once we condition on the income of the exporter wv, our model
delivers the following two results:
(i) The import penetration in sector z of country i is larger for exporters that exhibit a higher
RCA in z.
(ii) If we compare importers with di¤erent incomes, the import penetration in sector z by exporters
that exhibit a higher RCA in z is relatively larger in richer importers.
13Several papers provide evidence consistent with this prediction. For example, Alcala (2012) shows that import
prices by the US in the apparel industry tend to be higher for imports sourced from exporter displaying a higher
revealed comparative advantage in that industry. In a previous working paper version, Jaimovich and Merella
(2013), we show that a similar correlation is found considering all 5000 products categorised according to the 6-digit
Harmonised System (HS-6), and all pairs of bilateral sectoral trade ows in the world. Furthermore, empirical
results consistent with this assumption can also be found in articles using rm-level data. For example, Kugler and
Verhoogen (2012) nd a positive correlation between output prices in narrowly dened products and plant size for
Colombian manufacturing rms, while Manova and Zhang (2012) report a positive correlation between unit values
and total export sales by Chinese rms. Similarly, Crino and Epifani (2012) nd that Italian manufacturing rms
exhibiting higher TFP tend to concentrate their production in high-quality varieties and export relatively more to
richer destinations.
14There is also vast evidence supporting this prediction: e.g., Hallak (2006, 2010), Choi et al. (2009), Fieler
(2012), Feenstra and Romalis (2012), Crozet et al. (2012), Chen and Juvenal (2014), Flach (2014). In particular,
Fieler (2012) shows that import prices correlate positively with the level of income per head of the importer, even
when looking at products originating from the same exporter and HS-6 category. The use of unit values as proxy
for quality dates back to Schott (2004). See Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011) for some innovative
methods to infer quality from prices, taking into account both horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation of products.
19
Result (i) is simply saying that all importers tend to buy more of good z from exporters
displaying a revealed comparative advantage in sector z. In that regard, result (i) is not really
informative about the interplay between our nonhomothetic preferences and the cost advantage of
exporters more specialised in a good z intensifying at the high-quality versions of that good. Result
(ii), instead, is the direct consequence of that particular mechanism. More precisely, this result is
suggestive of a positive correlation between import penetration and the exporters revealed com-
parative advantage of varying magnitude depending on the income of the importer. This feature
could be captured by a regression that allows for heterogeneous intensity of import penetration
at di¤erent levels of importer income. For example, a regression including an interaction term
between exporters RCA and importers GDP per head:
log
 
IP iz;v

=  log (RCAz;v) +  [log (RCAz;v) log(wi)] + ' log(wi) +  log(wv) + uiz;v: (13)
A regression of this type should yield an estimated value of  > 0 to be consistent with our
model. The theoretical rationale for this prediction lies in the interaction between richer consumers
buying higher quality versions of the traded goods, and exporters with a stronger RCA in a sector
being increasingly productive at delivering high quality versions of these goods. Notice that (13)
includes the exporters per-capita GDP, wv, as additional regressor. This is done in order to
account for the fact that prices at which exporters sell their output may di¤er simply owing to
di¤erences in local wages more precisely, in terms of our model results, once we condition on wv,
we are able to maintain the monotonicity between RCAz;v and z;v that we exploit in results (i)
and (ii) above.
In terms of actual implementation, our regression needs to include a number of additional
controls. In particular, we consider:
 Importer xed e¤ects. In our main regression, given by (14) below, we substitute the
importers per-capita GDP (wi) by a set of importers xed e¤ects. Since we are using a cross
section of countries, these su¢ ce to control for importer income. In addition, our model
assumes identical trade openness and barriers across all importers, which in practice does
not seem a tenable assumption. Including importer xed e¤ects partly controls for some of
these factors as well.
 Exporter xed e¤ects. Similarly, we substitute exporters per-capita GDP (wv) by a set
of exporters xed e¤ects. Like with importer xed e¤ects, the exporter xed e¤ects control
for additional e¤ects, possibly present in practice, that are assumed away by our model (e.g.,
di¤erences in openness across exporters).
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 Product xed e¤ects. Our model assumes symmetry of technologies for all sectors, while
it also assumes no di¤erential trade costs or barriers across sectors. In practice, these as-
sumptions do not seem tenable either. In our main regression (14) we thus include product
xed e¤ects to control for some of these factors.15
 Gravity terms. Our model assumes away any sort of trade costs or frictions that are
partner-specic, hence (13) applies identically to any importer-exporter transaction. In
practice, not only there are trade costs and frictions, but also they a¤ect di¤erent part-
ners di¤erently. In our main regression (14) we include the standard gravity terms to control
for some of these factors.
In Table 1.A, we therefore show the results of regression (14) using sectoral bilateral trade data
for year 2009, where we include product dummies (z), importer dummies (i), exporter dummies
("v), and a set of bilateral gravity terms (Gi;v) taken from Mayer and Zignago (2006):16
log
 
IP iz;v

=  log (RCAz;v) +  [log (wi) log (RCAz;v)]
+Gi;v + z + i + "v + z;v;i:
(14)
Before moving on to the estimation results, we should conclude this subsection by stressing that
our regression analysis aims is capturing only a partial correlation coe¢ cient, possibly becoming
stronger at higher levels of importer income per head. The coe¢ cient  > 0 is indeed indicative of
such varying partial correlation. We rely on our model to interpret this result as emerging from the
interplay between nonhomotheticities in quality and widening productivity di¤erentials at higher
levels of the quality ladder. However, as a simple set of correlations, the coe¢ cients in (14) cannot
be directly linked to fundamental parameters of the model. Also for this reason, we cannot make
use of those estimates to back out the values of those parameters and thus construct quantitative
counterfactuals with them.
15 In some specications, we substitute the importer xed e¤ects and product xed e¤ects by importer-product
xed e¤ects. These can account for di¤erences in sectoral market structures and sectoral trade barriers across
importers. In addition, they may also account for heterogeneity in importers preferences for di¤erent goods, which
is assumed away by our common utility function.
16 Import penetration, as dened by (9), and revealed comparative advantage, as dened by (10), are both computed
using the dataset compiled by Gaulier and Zignago (2010). This database reports monetary values of bilateral trade
(measured FOB in US dollars) for years 1995 to 2009 for more than 5000 products categorised according to the
6-digit Harmonised System (HS-6). As robustness checks, we have also run the regressions reported in Table 1.A
separately for all the years in the sample. All their estimates results are of very similar in magnitude to those of
year 2009, and available upon request. Notice, also, that the fact that we are looking at a cross-section of countries
implicitly works as holding xed  in the model.
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Table 1.A
(1) (2) (3)
Log RCA exporter 0.456*** -0.676*** -0.469***
(0.026) (0.138) (0.106)
Interaction term 0.119*** 0.104***
(0.015) (0.012)
Distance expo-impo (× 1000) -0.121***
(0.009)
Contiguity 1.098***
(0.101)
Common official language 0.362***
(0.099)
Common coloniser 0.255*
(0.152)
Common legal origin 0.204***
(0.082)
Common currency 0.351**
(0.149)
Observations 5,773,873 5,773,873 5,571,567
Number of importers 184 184 184
Adj R squared 0.47 0.47 0.53
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at  the importer and exporter level reported in parentheses. All data corresponds to the year 2009.
All regressions include product dummies, importer dummies and exporter dummies. The total number of HS 6-digit products is 5017.
 * significant 10%; ** significant 5%; *** significant 1%.
Dep. Variable: log impo shares of product z  sourced from exporter v
4.2 Baseline regression results
Before strictly running regression (14), we rstly regress the dependent variable against only the
RCA of exporter v in good z (together with product, importer and exporter dummies). Column (1)
of Table 1.A shows (quite expectably) that those two variables are positively correlated. Secondly,
in column (2), we report the results of the regression that includes the interaction term. We can
see that the estimated  is positive and highly signicant, consistent with our theory. Finally,
in column (3), we add the six traditional gravity terms, and we can observe the previous results
remain essentially intact. We can also observe that the estimates for each of the gravity terms are
signicant, and they all carry the expected sign.
Notice that regression (14) includes exporter xed e¤ects ("v). This implies that our regres-
sions are actually comparing di¤erent degrees of export specialisation across products for a given
exporter, and the di¤erent degrees of import penetration of the exporter across its exports des-
tinations. As such, exporter dummies would control for the fact that richer exporters may be
commanding larger market shares and may be specialising in higher quality varieties of goods,
which are exactly the varieties mostly purchased by richer importers.
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4.3 Robustness checks and Linder term
Table 1.B presents some additional regressions as robustness checks. First, in column (1) we show
the results of a regression analogous to column (3) in Table 1.A, but where we control for product-
importer xed e¤ects, instead of product (z) and importer (i) xed e¤ects separately. After
including the set of product-importer dummies, the estimated coe¢ cient for the interaction term
remains essentially intact, as well as its signicance level. Next, in columns (2) and (3) we exclude
from the importers sample the OECD countries and the high-income countries as classied by the
World Bank, respectively. The idea behind these restricted-sample regressions is to see whether
our previous results are driven only by the behaviour of the richest importers. As we can observe,
in both cases our correlation of interest remains still positive and highly signicant.17
Our paper emphasises the interplay between nonhomothetic preferences with respect to quality
and increasing sectoral specialisation at higher qualities of production. The interaction term in
(14) intends to reect the impact of such mechanism on the intensity of bilateral trade links at
di¤erent levels of income per head of the importer. Some recent articles in the trade literature
with nonhomothetic preferences have argued that richer countries exhibit a comparative advantage
in higher-quality varieties of goods see Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2011).18 If that is
actually the case in reality and, moreover, if the share of imports to GDP grows with the importers
income per capita (as it has been widely documented in the trade literature), then our interaction
term in (14) may end up capturing (at least partially) a di¤erent type of e¤ect: the fact that
richer importers, who tend to source a larger fraction of their nal demand from abroad, establish
stronger trade links with richer countries, since these tend to specialise in higher-quality varieties
which are in turn those demanded by richer importers. In order to deal with this concern, the
regression in column (4) adds a Linder term among the regressors. In particular, we include as
independent variable the absolute di¤erence between the log income per head of the importer and
exporter: jln yimpo   ln yexpo j.19 This regressor should absorb the above-mentioned concern. The
results in column (4) indeed show that the Linder term carries a negative and highly signicant
coe¢ cient, which is consistent with the evidence of the Linder hypothesis holding at the sectoral
level previously found in Hallak (2010). Nevertheless, the estimate of the coe¢ cient associated
17The estimate associated to common currencyfalls essentially to zero in columns (2) and (3). This is because
when we remove the Euro-area countries from the sample, we lose practically all its source of variation.
18 In fact, this result is also present in our model when we extend our basic setup in Section 3 to allow for
cross-country income inequality.
19When we use (ln yimpo   ln yexpo )2 instead, the results remain qualitatively the same as in column (4).
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to the interaction term remains positive and highly signicant. This last result suggests that our
mechanism explaining the intensity of sectoral trade links by export source at di¤erent levels of
income of importers is playing a role alongside the traditional Linder-type e¤ect.20
In our theory, both the measures of import penetration and revealed comparative advantage are
endogenous variables, determined simultaneously as general equilibrium outcomes of the model.
For this reason, we cannot interpret those estimates for RCA and the interaction term in Table
1.A and Table 1.B as quantifying a causal e¤ect. However, it still proves interesting to use the
estimates in column (4) of Table 1.B to get a feeling of the magnitudes of the correlations arising
20 In practical terms, one additional concern may be raised: the possibility that high-quality varieties of goods
face lower trade frictions than lower-quality ones. If this were true, then our interaction term in (14) might also
be capturing a di¤erent type of e¤ect: the fact that richer economies tend to consume higher-quality varieties, and
that those varieties are traded more intensely as a result of lower frictions. Since we cannot observe unit trade costs
at di¤erent layers of quality, and our regressions exploit within-product variation of import shares by source, we
cannot envisage a practical way to directly gauge the severity of this concern. Notice, however, that if this issue were
quantitatively signicant, we should expect to nd very di¤erent estimate for distanceand contiguityin column
(1) and column (3), since the latter excludes richer importers. Indeed, the fact that both regressions yield similar
estimates suggests that, once we control for all the importer and exporter characteristics, we do not observe huge
di¤erences in the e¤ects of sector-specic trade frictions across richer and poorer importers.
24
from the mechanism proposed by our model relative to those captured by the Linder term.
Our mechanism entails a greater intensity of sectoral bilateral trade between richer importers
and exporters displaying a stronger RCA in the sector. For that reason, in what follows, we
quantify the di¤erence in the correlation between these two variables for a rich importer and a
poor importer, at the level of the logarithm of the RCA corresponding to its 90th percentile (this
value equals 1:07).21 Computing the di¤erence in magnitude yielded by the interaction term for the
importer in the 90th percentile of the GDP per head in PPP (which corresponds to Belgium with
34; 625) and that one for 10th percentile (which corresponds to Mali with 999), we obtain that the
90th-percentile exporter in a given sector (measured by the RCA) exhibits an income penetration
that is approximately 32.6% larger in the high-income importer relative to the low-income importer.
Similarly, using the estimate for the Linder term ( 0:117) with the absolute di¤erence between the
logarithm of Belgiums and Malis GDP per head in PPP, we obtain that economies in the top 90th
and bottom 10th percentile of income tend to exhibit import penetrations approximately 41.5%
lower than those displayed by equally rich countries. These simple computations suggest that both
mechanisms seem to be driving important quantitative e¤ects in terms of the correlations between
sectoral bilateral trade links and income per head observed in the data.
Lastly, the regressions in Table 1.A pool together approximately 5000 di¤erent 6-digit prod-
ucts, implicitly assuming the same coe¢ cients for all of them. This might actually be a strong
assumption to make. In Table 2.A we split the set of HS 6-digit products according to fourteen
separate subgroups at the 2-digit level.22 In the sake of brevity, we report only the estimates for 
and  in (14). As we can observe, the estimates for each subgroup follow a similar pattern as those
in Table 1.A: the estimate for the interaction term is always positive and highly signicant for
each subgroup. As one further robustness check, in Table 2.B we report the percentage of positive
and negative estimates obtained for  when we run a separate regression for each of the products
in the HS 6-digit categorisation. These results again tend to conrm those obtained before Table
1.A.
21The median number of exporters by product in our sample is 80, therefore the 90th percentile value of the RCA
seems a sensible benchmark to look at for a highly specialised exporterof the product.
22The subgroups are formed by merging together subgroups at 2-digit aggregation level, according to
http://www.foreign-trade.com/reference/hscode.htm. We excluded the subgroups Miscellaneousand Service.
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Table 2.A
animal & vegetable mineral chem. & plastic & skin, leath.
anim. prod. products products allied ind. rubbers & furs
log RCA -0.322*** -0.298*** -0.344*** -0.269** -0.500*** -0.548*** -0.622***
(0.106) (0.104) (0.096) (0.145) (0.138) (0.138) (0.155)
interaction term 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.120***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 105,332 210,866 215,975 72,839 602,592 317,328 66,347
Adj. R squared 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.49 0.52 0.60
wood & stone & machinery
wood prod. glass & electrical
log RCA -0.444*** -0.411*** -0.644*** -0.527*** -0.541*** -0.711*** -0.554***
(0.105) (0.166) (0.155) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) (0.112)
interaction term 0.101*** 0.090*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.111*** 0.134*** 0.114***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 252,135 795,926 75,522 209,397 630,910 1,296,090 176,916
Adj. R squared 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.53
Robust absolute standard errors clustered at the importer-exporter level in parentheses. All data corresponds to year 2009.
All regression include product, exporter and importer dummies, and the set of gravity terms used before in Table 1.A taken
from Mayer & Zignano (2006). *** significant 1%.
transport.textiles footwear
foodstuff
metals
Table 2.B
median
insignificant significant 10% significant 1% insignificant significant 10% significant 1% coefficient
Total number of different products was 4904 (98 products were lost due to insufficient observations).  Data corresponds to year 2009
Regressions include importer dummies and the set of gravity terms used in Table 1.A taken from Mayer & Zignano (2006).
Independent regressions for each HS 6-digit product
0.076
1.6%
% positive coefficients % negative coefficients
83.5% 16.4%
29.8% 15.7% 38.0% 14.3% 0.5%
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4.4 A comparison with the empirical predictions in the existing literature
Three recent related articles have also incorporated nonhomothetic preferences into general equi-
librium trade models, and study the ensuing patterns of trade ows: Fieler (2011), Fajgelbaum,
Grossman and Helpman (2011) FGH, and Jaimovich and Merella (2012). In the Introduction,
we summarised mostly the main theoretical di¤erences between our framework and theirs. We now
discuss briey how some of our empirical predictions di¤er from theirs, and how these di¤erences
may be discerned in the data.
Fieler (2011) focuses on the bilateral trade ows of horizontally di¤erentiated goods displaying
heterogeneous income demand elasticities.23 She nds that including intersectoral nonhomothetic-
ities into a model à la Eaton and Kortum (2002), coupled with productivity dispersions across
countries that correlate positively with income demand elasticities, can substantially improve its
quantitative predictions on aggregate trade ows. Her empirical predictions then encompass cross-
country variation of aggregate trade ows as a result of intersectoral changes in trade, while they
are silent about intrasectoral variations in trade ows. This last source of adjustment is exactly
what regression (14) aims at. More precisely, our regressions are exploiting within-product vari-
ation of export sources by importer, abstracting from intersectoral changes in trade ows. The
main novel empirical nding is that, looking at each particular sector in isolation, we can observe
that richer importers source a larger share of their imports from those exporters that display a
stronger degree of specialisation in the sector.
FGH shares with our framework the introduction of nonhomothetic preferences in a context
with vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation. Both papers lead to a rise in international specialisation
as incomes increase. The underlying driving forces however di¤er. In FGH, the main driving force
is the exploitation of a home-market e¤ect, in the spirit of Linder (1961).24 In our paper, instead,
the leading aspect is the deepening of heterogeneities in the cost of production across countries
at higher levels of quality. More importantly, our mechanism leads to some testable predictions
that cannot be straightforwardly rationalised by FGH. In particular, FGH leads to patterns of
productive specialisation that take place only along the quality dimension: richer countries are net
exporters of high-quality varieties, while poorer countries are net exporter of low-quality ones. Yet,
23See also Hunter (1991) and Francois and Kaplan (1996) for partial equilibrium frameworks assessing the relevance
of intersectoral di¤erences in income demand elasticities in explaining trade patterns.
24Hallak (2010) provides a partial equilibrium model with a home-market e¤ect that also builds on the original
hypothesis in Linder (1961). In his model, countries of similar incomes trade more with each other, when considering
sectoral level trade ows. He also provides empirical evidence for this prediction.
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those patterns of specialisation in quality cannot be ascribed to any specic sector. By contrast, in
our model, for each particular sector, richer importers will end up establishing stronger trade links
with those exporters more intensely specialised in the sector. From a strict empirical viewpoint,
the mechanism suggested by FGH is then reected in the Linder term included in column (4) of
Table 2.A. However, even when we take this factor into account, this does not fully explain the
fact that richer economies source a larger fraction of their imports of each product from exporters
exhibiting a comparative advantage in those products. In that regard, our mechanism seems to
play an important role in the determination of sectoral trade links, alongside the more traditional
Linder home-market e¤ect.
Nonhomotheticities along both the vertical and horizontal dimensions is also a feature present
in Jaimovich and Merella (2012). The main distinction between that model and the one presented
here lies in the technological structure. Jaimovich and Merella (2012) remained within a traditional
Ricardian framework where comparative advantages apply only at the sectoral level. There, richer
economies specialise in goods with longer quality ladders and poorer ones in those with shorter
ladders. The model presented here, instead, exploits an intrasectoral comparative advantage. This,
in turn, delivers predictions for the degree of specialisation within the same product category, which
cannot be rationalised by a model featuring full sectoral specialisation by a single country, like in
Jaimovich and Merella (2012). In particular, that model is unable to account for some of the novel
empirical ndings that we delineate here: i.e., the intensity of sectoral specialization by exporters
at di¤erent levels of quality of production, and the varying intensity of import penetration at
di¤erent levels of importersincome.
5 Further Discussion
The next subsections develop two simple extensions to our model in Section 3, in order to study
the impact of di¤erent policies aimed at promoting the production and size of a particular sector
in the economy. We rst study the case of import tari¤s, then the case of a subsidy to local
producers. In the sake of brevity, we relegate the formal analysis of both subsections to the Online
Appendix, in Section ?? and Section ?? respectively.
5.1 Trade frictions and consumer loss
Although the main focus of the paper is on the behaviour of sectoral import shares, our model
carries also implications regarding trade frictions and consumer welfare. In particular, in our
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framework, import restrictions entail a more severe welfare loss for richer countries than for poorer
ones. Intuitively, our nonhomothetic structure implies that richer importers choose higher-quality
bundles of goods and devote a larger share of income to goods sourced from exporters who can
more e¢ ciently increase quality of production. Therefore, since comparative advantages deepen
and gains from trade expand at higher levels of quality, it is rich consumers those who benet most
from frictionless trade.
To illustrate the argument succinctly, it proves more convenient to consider a simplied version
of our model with only two levels of sectoral productivity draws z;v 2 f; g and a discrete
number of countries. In particular, we let region L and region H comprise now two countries each:
L = fl1; l2g and H = fh1; h2g. Like before, countries in L always receive the bad sectoral draw 
in all sectors. Instead, for region H, we assume that in each sector z one country receives z;v = 
and the other one z;v = . To keep the symmetry we had in Section 3, suppose that h1 and h2
have both an equal mass of sectors with good and bad sectoral productivity draws.25
Consider rst a country from region L. This country (by assumption) receives the bad pro-
ductivity draw, , in sector z. Suppose that, for some reason, this country wishes to discourage
imports of good z, and thus imposes a tari¤ on those goods.26 Since countries in region L are
poorer, the welfare loss to local consumers owing to the tari¤ will not be too large. The reason
for this is that individuals in region L tend to purchase lower-quality varieties of z, and for these
varieties the productivity gap relative to the most e¢ cient producer in sector z remains relatively
narrow. Consider now the country in region H that received the bad productivity draw in sector z.
In this case, the welfare loss to local consumer resulting from a tari¤ on imports of good z becomes
more severe. Since richer consumers are those who intend to purchase higher-quality versions of
good z, they end up being harmed relatively more by tari¤s imposed on sectors where there are
other countries that can more easily upgrade quality. In that respect, our model suggests that
gains from trade are especially stronger for richer consumers and, therefore, high-income countries
should display a more negative stance towards trade barriers to imports.
In order to o¤er a hint of the relative magnitude of welfare loss between richer and poorer
importers, in the Online Appendix ?? we exploit a pooled estimation of the log of unit values (used
as a proxy for quality) on the log of importers income to back out two gures. First, we pinpoint
25That is, for each sector z, there is always only one country in H with draw  (and only one with draw ), while
the mass of sectors that received a draw  is equal to 0:5 both in h1 and in h2.
26This could be the result, for example, of policymakers of country i believing sector z represents an important
sector where to develop enough local production, hence it needs protection from more e¢ cient foreign producers.
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several implied values of the sectoral productivity draws. Then we derive the respective welfare
loss di¤erential, due to import tari¤, that each of those draws would generate when comparing
individuals from countries with di¤erent levels of income.
The fact that the consumer welfare loss owing to the tari¤ is greater in richer economies rests
crucially on our specic non-homothetic structure of preferences. In particular, under homothetic
preferences, willingness to pay for higher quality will not rise with income. In such a case, all
consumers, regardless of their income, will su¤er a welfare loss of equal magnitude after the impo-
sition of an import tari¤. In Section ?? of the Online Appendix we show formally how the unequal
welfare e¤ects of a tari¤ vanish away in the presence of homothetic preferences.
5.2 Sectoral subsidy and comparative advantage
The previous subsection has illustrated the di¤erential welfare e¤ects of a sector-specic import
tari¤ across richer and poorer importers. One could rationalise this tari¤ as the outcome of a policy
that aims at promoting some particular sector of the economy. An alternative (and, possibly, more
direct) policy to foster sector z is simply to subsidize the local producers in that sector.
Consider again the simplied model introduced in the previous subsection, and suppose that
a country with a bad productivity draw in sector z (i.e., a country v with z;v = ) introduces
a subsidy for local producers of good z, with the intention of expanding the size of this sector.
In our model, such a subsidy turns out to be more e¤ective in increasing the share of sector z
in the GDP in poorer economies than in richer ones. The reason for this is again related to our
nonhomothetic preference structure. In our model, in order to absorb a larger share of demand
in sector z, a country must be able to o¤er higher-quality varieties of good z more cheaply than
their competitors. When we compare a country from region L with the country from region H
that received the bad draw in sector z, it turns out that the impact of the subsidy in fostering
sector z is stronger in the former. The intuition for this result is that, given our non-homothetic
structure of preferences, higher qualities are instrumental to attracting larger consumer spending
shares. Therefore, the expansionary e¤ect of the subsidy turns out to be larger in L than in a
country from region H with the same draw of z;v = , as in the former the e¤ect of the subsidy
on quality expansion is compounded with the lower labour cost in L.27
27 In Section ?? of the Online Appendix we show formally how this result disappears when we substitute our
non-homothetic preferences by homothetic preferences.
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6 Conclusion
We presented a Ricardian model of trade with the distinctive feature that comparative advantages
reveal themselves gradually over the course of development. The key factors behind this process
are the individuals upgrading in quality of consumption combined with sectoral productivity
di¤erentials that widen up at higher levels of quality. As incomes grow and wealthier consumers
raise the quality of their consumption baskets, cost di¤erentials between countries become more
pronounced. The emergence of such heterogeneities, in turn, alters sectoral trade ows, as each
economy gradually further specialises in producing the subset of goods for which they enjoy a
rising comparative advantage.
Our theory yielded a number of implications that nd empirical support. Using bilateral trade
data at the product level, we showed that the share of imports originating from exporters more
intensely specialised in a given product correlates positively with GDP per head of the importer.
This is consistent with richer consumers buying a larger share of their consumption of specic
goods from countries exhibiting a comparative advantage in the sectors producing those goods.
Our core model assumed away any sort of trade frictions. This was in a sense a deliberate choice,
so as to illustrate our proposed mechanism as cleanly as possible. In this respect, we extended
our analysis in two directions, discussing some interesting policy implications of our theory in
the presence of frictions. First, gains from free trade are stronger for more developed economies.
Second, sectoral subsidies to local producers are more e¤ective in stimulating their production and
exports when introduced in developing countries. These ndings seem to t well with some recent
claims suggesting that policy interventions may help developing countries in becoming stronger
competitors in sectors where they previously enjoyed no comparative advantage.
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Appendices
A Omitted proofs
Formal Solution of the Consumer Optimisation Problem. By using the expression (5)
for physical consumption and the price functions (2), the consumer optimisation problem can be
re-stated as one where the consumer must choose the optimal quality qz;v and optimal budget
allocation z;v for each commodity (z; v) 2 Z V. Thus, using the index i 2 V to denote country
of origin of the consumer, the optimisation problem can be thus re-stated as follows:
max
fqiz;v ;iz;vg(z;v)2ZV
U =
(Z
Z
"Z
V
qiz;v ln
 
1 + 
A
iz;v 
qiz;v
z;v wiwv
!
dv
#
dz
) 1

subject to:
Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v dv dz  1; and qiz;v  1:
(15)
Denoting by i the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint, and by iz;v the
Lagrange multipliers associated to each constraint qiz;v  1, we may derive the rst-order conditions:
lniz;v   z;v ln qiz;v + ln (1 + )  lnA+ ln

wi
wv

  z;v + iz;v = 0; (16)
1

  z
qiz;v
iz;v
  i = 0; (17)
qiz;v   1  0; iz;v  0; and
 
qiz;v   1

iz;v = 0; (18)
1 
Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v dv dz  0; i  0; and

1 
Z
Z
Z
V
iz;v dv dz

i = 0: (19)
where:
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;
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"Z
V
qiz;v ln
 
1 + 
A
iz;v 
qiz;v
z;v wiwv
!
dv
#1 
:
Note that, although z in (17) are indexed by z, in the optimum all z will turn out to be equal.
Hence, we may write that, in the optimum, z =  for all z, and dene:
i  (
  ) i;
which in turn allows us to re-write (17) as qiz;v = 
iiz;v. Hence, integrating both sides of the
equation over V and Z, and noting that in the optimum the rst expression in (19) always hold
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with equality, we may obtain: Z
Z
Z
V
qiz;v dv dz = 
i. (20)
This in turn implies that:
iz;v =
qiz;v
i
: (21)
Finally, note that (20) can be interpreted as the average quality of the optimal consumption basket.
Denoting this by Qi  i, from (21) it straightforwardly follows that iz;v = qiz;v=Qi.
Proof of Lemma 1. We rst show that when wv = w for all v, none of the constraints qz;v  1
of (15) binds in the optimum. For this, note that given the expressions in (16) and (21), whenever
wv = w for all v, it must be the case that qiz0;v0  qiz00;v00 , z0;v0  z00;v00 . Thus, if in the optimum
qiz00;v00 > 1 holds for a pair (z
00; v00) with z00;v00 = , then qiz;v > 1 must be true for all pairs (z; v).
Then, in order to prove that qiz;v > 1 holds for all (z; v), it su¢ ces to prove the following: even
when all z;v = , except for one single good-variety (z
00; v00) for which z00;v00 = , the problem
(15) yields qiz00;v00 > 1. If this is the case, then q
i
z00;v00 > 1 will actually hold true for any distribution
of the productivity draws z;v with support in the interval

; 

.
When all z;v = , except for a single (z
00; v00) with z00;v00 = , then when qz00;v00 = 1:
qiz;v = e
  
 1

1 + 
Ai
 1
 1
; for all (z; v) 2 Z V other than  z00; v00 : (22)
Integrating (22) across the space Z and V, we obtain i = e =( 1)

(1 + ) =
 
Ai
1=( 1), which
in turn yields:
i =
1
e

1 + 
A
 1

: (23)
Now, plugging (23) into (16) and (21), computed for (z00; v00), while using the fact that iz00;v00 = 1=i
when qiz00;v00 = 1:
ln (1 + )  lnA  [ln (1 + )  lnA] = + ln e   + iz00;v00 = 0: (24)
Hence, considering the denition of A  e ( 1)=( 1), (24) reduces to
ln (1 + ) + iz00;v00

   1 = 0: (25)
However, (25) cannot be true for any  > 0: As a consequence, it must be true that qz00;v00 > 1 for
all  > 0, implying in turn that qz;v > 1 must hold under any distribution of z;v with support
within the interval

; 

when wv = w for all v. Now, taking into account the above result, we
can use (20), (21) and (16), setting iz;v = 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V, to obtain (6) and (7).
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Proof of Lemma 2. When wv = w for all v 2 V, since iz;v = 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V, using (21)
into (16) leads to ln (1 + )  lnA  lni = z;v +
 
z;v   1

ln qiz;v for all (z; v) 2 ZV. Dening
now i()  ln (1 + )  lnA  lni, we can observe that:
@i
@
=
 
z;v   1

qiz;v
@qiz;v
@
: (26)
But, given that
 
z;v   1

> 0, then all @qiz;v=@ must necessarily carry the same sign. Suppose
then that @qiz;v=@  0, for all (z; v) 2 Z  V. Recalling (20), it follows that @i=@  0 as well.
But, since @i=@ = (1 + ) 1  i 1 @i=@, the fact that @i=@  0 implies that @i=@ > 0,
which in turn contradicts the fact that @qiz;v=@  0 for all (z; v) 2 ZV. As a result, it must be
the case that @qiz;v=@ > 0 for all (z; v) 2 Z V. Finally, the result @2qiz;v=
 
@ @z;v

< 0 follows
immediately from the expression in (26), after noting that @
 
@i=@

=@z;v = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. Notice rst that M iz;v  iz;v and M iz 
R
V 
i
z;v dv. Also, when all countries
in the world have the same wage (and, therefore, the same income), in the optimum iz;v = z;v
for all importers. Moreover, the symmetry in the distribution of draws z;v, also implies that, in
the optimum, M iz = 1. Therefore, using (9), IP
i
z;v = z;v.
To compute the RCA, note that Xz;v 
R
V 
i
z;v di, Xv 
R
Z
R
V 
i
z;v di dz, Wz 
R
VXz;v dv and
W  RZWz dz. Then, using the fact that iz;v = z;v for all importers, then Xz;v = R 10 z;v di =
z;v. Moreover, the budget constraint in turn implies thatXv 
R 1
0 z;v dz = 1. Also, the symmetry
in the distribution of draws z;v implies that the aggregate world spending in good z will be equal
for all goods, thus Wz =
R
V z;v dv = 1. Plugging in all these results into (10), and using the fact
that W = 1, the claimed RCAz;v = z;v result follows.
Proof of Proposition 1. Preliminarily, notice that (20) together with (21) yields:
z0;v0 =
qz0;v0R
Z
R
V qz;v dv dz
: (27)
From (16), together with Lemma 1 and Proposition ??, we have:
 
z;v   1

ln qz;v + z;v = ln (1 + )  lnA  ln; (28)
thus, computing (28) for any pair of commodities (z0; v0) and (z; v) yields:
 
z0;v0   1

ln qz0;v0 + z0;v0 =
 
z;v   1

ln qz;v + z;v: (29)
Hence, (29) implies that qz0;v0 > qz;v () z0;v0 < z;v. By considering this result in conjunction
with (27), our claim immediately follows.
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Furthermore, di¤erentiating (29) with respect to  yields:
dqz0;v0
d
=
z;v   1
z0;v0   1
qz0;v0
qz;v
dqz;v
d
: (30)
Using (20), (28) and (30):
dqz0;v0
d
=
A
1 + 

z0;v0   1
qz0;v0
  1

Z
Z
Z
V
z0;v0   1
z;v   1
qz;v
qz0;v0
dv dz
 1
> 0 (31)
Moreover, from (27), and considering (30) and (31):
dz0;v0
d
=
1
2
dqz0;v0
d
Z
Z
Z
V

z;v   z0;v0
z;v   1

qz;v dv dz

(32)
It is then easy to observe that (30) implies that dqz0;v0=d > dqz;v=d when z0;v0 < z;v. By
considering this result in conjunction with (32) our claim immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Part (i). From the FOC (16)-(19) we may obtain that for a consumer in any country in
region L the following conditions must hold:
  (   1) ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA   + LL = 0; for all (z; l) 2 Z L; (33)
   z;h   1 ln qLz;h  lnL+ ln (1 + )  lnA  lnwh z;h+ Lz;h = 0; for all (z; h) 2 ZH: (34)
Similarly, for a consumer in any country in region H, it must be true that:
  (   1) ln qHL   lnH + ln (1 + )  lnA+ lnwh    + HL = 0; for all (z; l) 2 Z L; (35)
   z;h   1 ln qHz;h   lnH + ln (1 + )  lnA  z;h + Hz;h = 0; for all (z; h) 2 ZH: (36)
Suppose now there exists some (z0; v0) 2 Z  V for which qLz0;v0 > qHz0;v0 . Then, combining either
(33) and (35), or (34) and (36), in both cases we would obtain that:
ln

H
Lwh

=
 
z0;v0   1

ln
 
qLz0;v0
qHz0;v0
!
+ Hz0;v0 > 0: (37)
Expression (37) implies, in turn, that 1 < L < whL < H : From (20), it follows there must
exist some (z00; v00) 2 Z  V for which qLz00;v00 < qHz00;v00 . Using the same reasoning, we now obtain
ln
 
Lwh=
H

=
 
z00;v00   1

ln(qHz00;v00=q
L
z00;v00) + 
L
z00;v00 > 0; which contradicts (37). As a conse-
quence, it must be the case that qHz;v  qLz;v for all (z; v) 2 Z V.
Now, suppose qHz0;v0 = q
L
z0;v0 > 1 for some (z
0; v0) 2 Z  V. Again, combining either the pair of
equations (33) and (35), or the pair of equations (34) and (36), we obtain:
ln
 
H=Lwh

= 0: (38)
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Expression (38) implies, in turn, that 1 < L < whL = H : Hence, there must exist again
some (z00; v00) 2 Z  V for which qLz00;v00 < qHz00;v00 . Using the same reasoning, we now obtain
ln
 
Lwh=
H

=
 
z00;v00   1

ln(qHz00;v00=q
L
z00;v00) > 0;which contradicts (38). Therefore, it must be
true that qHz;v > q
L
z;v for all (z; v) 2 Z V, whenever qHz;v > 1:
Part (ii). The proof that qiz;l = q
i
L for all (z; l) 2 Z L follows straightforwardly from (33) and
(35). For the second argument, let i = L, and consider the commodity (z0; h0) 2 ZH such that
qLz0;h0 = q
L
L > 1. Using (33) and (34) we obtain, respectively:
  (   1) ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA   = 0; and
   z0;h0   1 ln qLL   lnL + ln (1 + )  lnA  lnwh   z0;h0 = 0:
This, in turn, leads to:
(   1) ln qLL +  =
 
z0;h0   1

ln qLL + lnwh + z0;h0 : (39)
Isolating now z0;h0 from (39) we then have z0;h0 =    lnwh=
 
1 + ln qLL
  b < . Suppose
now that b  . Since @qLz;h=@z;h  0, from the denition of b it follows that qLz;h  qLL for all
(z; h) 2 Z  H. Next, from the denition of L, we obtain that L  qLL. In addition, from the
market clearing condition for a country in L, we have qHL wh=
H + (1  ) qLL=L = 1, where 
is the measure of countries in region H. This leads to 1   qHL wh=H = (1  ) qLL=L > 1   ,
which in turn implies that qHL wh=
H < 1. Now, using the fact that whL > H and the result
L  qLL, the last inequality nally yields qHL < L  qLL, leading to a contradiction. Hence, it must
necessarily be that b > . Thus, given the fact that @qLz;h=@z;h < 0 whenever qLz;h > 1, the result
qLz; < q
L
L < q
L
z; immediately follows. An analogous reasoning, letting i = H, may be followed to
prove that qHz; < q
H
L < q
H
z;.
Part (iii). The claim follows by di¤erentiation of (34) and (36). This yields @qiz;h=@z;h =
 qiz;h

1 + ln qiz;h

=
 
z;h   1

< 0 whenever qiz;h > 1, while @q
i
z;h=@z;h = 0 whenever q
i
z;h = 1:
Proof of Lemma 4. To compute (11) and (12), note that total exports by sector z from country
v are Xz;v = Hz;vwh + (1  )Lz;v, and aggregate exports by country v are Xv = wv. Now, notice
that since z;l = , we must have that 
H
z;l = 
H
L and 
L
z;l = 
L
L, for all (z; l) 2 Z  L. Plugging
these expressions into (10) then yields (11). Moreover, since all h obtain their draws of z;h from
independent U

; 

distributions, and since all Hz;h are well-dened functions of z;h, by the law
of large numbers it follows that
R
Z 
H
z;h dz and
R
Z 
L
z;h dz must both yield an identical value for
every country h 2 H. Using these expressions, in conjunction with those for Xz;v and Xv into (10)
then leads to (12).
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows from noting that: (a) both Hz;h and 
L
z;h in (12) are
functions of z;h; (b) Proposition 2 implies that @
H
z;h=@z;h < 0 and @
L
z;h=@z;h < 0; (c) 
H
H and
LH represent average demand intensities, hence 
H
z; < 
H
H < 
H
z; and 
L
z; < 
L
H < 
L
z;; and (d)
from (11), it follows that RCAz;h = RCAz;l only if Hz;h = 
H
H and 
L
z;h = 
L
H .
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (i). Our claim immediately follows from part (iii) of Proposition
2 in conjunction with (21).
Part (ii). Using (35) and (36), together with (21), for a consumer from H we get:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  z;h   1 lnHz;h + z;h lnH + z;h, for all (z; h) 2 ZH:
= (   1) lnHz;l +  lnH   lnwh + , for all (z; l) 2 Z L:
Similarly, considering (33) and (34) together with (21), in the case of a consumer from L we obtain:
ln (1 + )  lnA =  z;h   1 lnLz;h + z;h lnL + lnwh + z;h   Lz;h, for all (z; h) 2 ZH:
= (   1) lnLz;l +  lnL +    LL, for all (z; l) 2 Z L:
On the one hand, equating the rst expression of the each case, simplifying and rearranging:
lnHz;h   lnLz;h =
z;h
 
lnL   lnH+ lnwh   Lz;h 
z;h   1
  kz;h:
Getting rid of the logs, we then obtain Hz;h = e
kz;hLz;h, and hence: 
H
z;h   Lz;h = (ekz;h   1)Lz;h.
Consider now two producers h0; h00 2 H such that z;h0 < z;h00 . Since Lz;h0   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Hz;h00
requires Hz;h00   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Lz;h0 , and from part (i) of this proof it follows that Lz;h00 < Lz;h0 ,
we are left to prove that kz;h00  kz;h0 . Suppose kz;h00 > kz;h0 . Since by assumption z;h0 < z;h00 ,
and part (ii) of Proposition 2 implies Lz;h0  Lz;h00 , a necessary condition for this to hold is 
z;h00   z;h0
  
lnL   lnH > 0. But this is impossible, since lnH > lnL. So it must be that
kz;h00  kz;h0 , hence Lz;h0   Lz;h00 < Hz;h0   Hz;h00 .
On the other hand, equating the second expression of each case, simplifying and rearranging:
lnHz;l   lnLz;l =

 
lnL   lnH+ lnwh   LL
   1  kz;l:
We can thus write Hz;l Lz;l =
 
ekz;l   1Lz;l and, following an analogous reasoning, it is straight-
forward to obtain Lz;   Lz;l < Hz;   Hz;l (and Lz;l   Lz; < Hz;l   Hz;).
B Cross-country inequality in a multi-region world
We now consider a setup where the world is composed by K > 2 regions, indexed by k = 1; :::;K.
We let Vk denote the subset of countries from region k, where Vk has Lebesgue measure k > 0. In
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addition, we let each country in region k be denoted by a particular vk. (All the results discussed
in this section are formalised in the Online Appendix, Section B.)
We assume that for any vk and every z, each z;vk is independently drawn from a uniform
distribution with support over [k; ], where k < . To keep the consistency with the previous
sections, let k =  when k = 1. In addition, let k0 < k00 for any two regions k
0 < k00. In
other words, we are indexing regions k = 1; :::;K in terms of rst-order stochastic dominance of
their respective uniform distributions. All uniform distributions are assumed to share the same
upper-bound , while they di¤er in their lower-bounds k.
In this extended setup, equilibrium wages display an analogous structure as the one described
in Proposition ??. Namely, in equilibrium, the wage in each vk is wk. In addition, equilibrium
wages are such that w1 > ::: > wk0 > ::: > wK , where 1 < k0 < K.
Notice that, since all individuals from the same region earn the same wages, they choose
identical consumption proles. We then let jz;vk denote the demand intensity by a consumer from
region Vj for good (z; vk). Once again, this immediately implies that IP jz;v = jz;v. Furthermore,
it follows that, for a country vk:
Xz;vk =
KX
j=1
jwj
j
z;vk
:
In equilibrium, it must be the case that Xvk = wk for all vk 2 Vk. In addition, Wz equal for all z
is still true in this extended setup. As a result, the RCA of country vk in good z is given by:
RCAz;vk =
PK
j=1 jwj
j
z;vk
wk
: (40)
Since wages di¤er across regions, once again, we cannot nd a monotonic relationship between
RCAz;vk in (40) and the productivity draws z;vk when all countries in the world are pooled
together. However, we can still nd a result analogous to Proposition 3. In particular, it is still
true that the highest value of RCAz;vk corresponds to the country in region V1 receiving the best
possible draw in sector z. That is, RCAz;vk is the highest for some country v1 with z;v1 = .
Lastly, concerning import penetration, this extension also yields a result that is analogous to
that in Proposition 4. Following the notation in Proposition 4, we can show that 1z; > ::: >
k
0
z; > ::: > 
K
z;, where 1 < k
0 < K. Again, this result stems from our nonhomothetic structure
along the quality dimension, which implies that richer consumers allocate a larger share of their
spending in good z to the producers who can most e¢ ciently o¤er higher qualities versions of z.
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